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1. Introduction 
 
Subnational mobilization, i.e. the engagement of subnational actors in European 
policymaking, is a central feature of the conceptions of multilevel policymaking in the 
European Union (EU). To a large extent the theoretical claims behind multilevel governance 
have been developed empirically on the example of emerging political interactions in the 
context of the EU’s regional economic policy, better known as the structural funds (Marks 
1992, 1993; Hooghe/Marks 2001). Originally subnational mobilization was a kind of a 
―combat term‖ aimed against the perceived dominance of intergovernmental interpretations of 
the European integration process. Before this background it is no surprise that the whole 
debate about the European regions’ relationships with the EU used to be coined by a 
vocabulary of transition and transformation (Jeffery 2000). In this article, we re-visit this 
debate which has peaked in the late 1990s, but goes on with somewhat lower intensity until 
today (Moore 2008).  
 
By now, this debate about subnational mobilization has produced many and complex 
theoretical assertions and expectations, and also—but to lesser extent—empirical research 
testing them. We take issue with three central expectations that have been put forward by the 
subnational mobilization camp. First, that the subnational mobilization logic of by-passing the 
national level leads subnational actors to desire strong supranational institutions. The second 
claim which we re-visit is that the subnational resource base determines the intensity of 
subnational-supranational political exchange, i.e. that subnational actors automatically want 
to intensify subnational-supranational interaction if only their resource base is above a certain 
threshold. A final claim to reassess is that one should observe subnational convergence, i.e. 
that (at least institutionally ―stronger‖) subnational actors are to converge with respect to their 
engagement with the supranational level. 
 
These (and other) claims have been intensely debated (Bache 1998, 1999; Jeffery 2000). The 
reason to revisit them now—almost two decades after the debate originated—is twofold. First, 
all three claims are ―time sensitive‖, thus change should be more pronounced and better 
observable as integration intensifies and time goes by. To what extent this time sensitivity is 
visible empirically has important implication for the assessment of dynamic elements of 
multilevel governance theory—in particular with view to perhaps overly optimistic 
conceptions of transnational learning processes on which it is based. Second, the original 
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debate has been mainly based methodologically on case studies and empirically the focus was 
EU structural policy. This paper uses attitudinal data from a survey of top-officials in regional 
administrations of five EU member state—thus bringing an up to now neglected empirical 
perspective into the debate. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. After this introduction, the major claims of the debate about 
subnational mobilization is summarised in more detail (section 2). In the next two chapters the 
strength and weaknesses of an analysis based on attitudinal data are discussed and the details 
about the survey from which the empirical data is taken are given (section 3 and 4). 
Subsequently, the three major claims are confronted with our survey results (sections 5). The 
article ends by summarising the findings and highlighting their implications for the emerging 
theory of multilevel governance (section 7). Among other thins, our analysis shows that 
administrators from institutionally weaker regions and from regions that are economically 
poorer than the EU average favour consolidating subnational-supranational institutional 
interaction. By contrast, with respect to cooperation in particular policy areas, it is the 
bureaucrats from regions with a GDP above EU-average who are in favour of involving the 
EU in areas where they have or seek policy competences. Our results are not easily 
explainable from the classical subnational mobilization perspective. 
 
2. The subnational mobilization theory 
 
In her classical article on the topic, Liesbet Hooghe defines subnational mobilization ―as an 
instrument to challenge state power, and to support supranational authority. Subnational units 
compete with member states for control over territorial interest aggregation. So the 
relationship is one of contested hierarchy, in which the supranational arena is expected to be 
on the side of the subnational level‖ (Hooghe 1995: 177).2 The empirical reference of the 
subnational mobilization debate is however the 1988 reform of the EU structural funds. This 
reform was coined by rhetoric of vertical partnership between all governmental levels and the 
aim to build subnational capacities in order to pave the way for sustainable regional economic 
development. Marks (1992, 1993) analysed the reform of the structural funds and developed 
on its basis the first versions of the multilevel governance thesis—formulated as a critique to 
                                                 
2
 Hooghe and Marks, the most prominent researchers in this debate, have refined their theoretical claims in 
separate or joint publications over the years (Hooghe/Marks 1996; Marks/Hooghe/Blank 1996; Hooghe/Marks 
2001). We would posit however that the crucial claims re-visited here have remained by and large ―intact‖, 
although the sophistication of the argument did certainly increase. As in our view these claims are in greater 
purity outlined in the original publications we refer in the following to those. 
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―state-centric‖ intergovernmentalist and (which is sometimes forgotten) also to ―supranational 
institution-centric‖ neo-functionalist accounts of European integration alike.  
 
A major point of the multilevel governance thesis is that institution building is not limited to 
the supranational level but may involve all politico-administrative layers (as well as societal 
interests) of the ―system‖. From such a vantage point, subnational-supranational interaction is 
not just a peripheral echo of ―real‖ integration at the European level. Rather—especially if 
connected with the hypothesis that the nation state is losing control about ―his‖ subnational 
level because it gets systematically by-passed—subnational-supranational political exchange 
becomes in this perspective a major empirical field to prove or disprove claims put forward 
either by intergovernmentalists or adherents of the multilevel governance thesis about the 
validity of their competing conceptualizations of what it actually is that drives the European 
integration dynamic. It is precisely in this context that the role of regions in the EU under the 
label of ―subnational mobilization‖, i.e. the increasing involvement of subnational bodies into 
the supranational policymaking, became theoretically meaningful for the ongoing debate 
(Hooghe 1995).  
 
Hence, the interest in regional ties with the EU was fuelled by the expectation that member 
states might be ―outflanked‖ by the transfer of authority to the EU and by ―incentives for 
newly assertive and politically meaningful regional bodies‖ (Marks 1993: 402) which shifted 
beyond the control of national governments. Eventually ―mobilization and empowerment of 
subnational governments‖ would lead to the emergence of a system of multilevel governance 
―characterized by co-decision-making across several nested tiers of government, ill-defined 
and shifting spheres of competences (creating a consequent potential for conflicts about 
competencies), and an ongoing search for principles of decisional distribution that might be 
applied to the emerging polity‖ (Marks 1992: 407).  
 
While the ―Europe of the Region‖ slogan was perhaps always wishful political thinking, also 
the ―Europe with the Regions‖ concept behind the multilevel governance interpretation of EU 
integration was not born out by reality. Although regional and local actors mobilised and 
engaged in European policymaking, empirical evidences showed very different mobilisation 
patterns among (admittedly also very heterogeneous) European regions (Marks et al. 1996; 
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Nielsen/Salk 1998).
3
 Accordingly, the notion of a ―Europe with some Regions‖ emerged 
(Marks et al. 1996) highlighting the sharp disparity of access to European policymaking 
between subnational authorities.  
 
To recall this context of the broader debate is necessary to appreciate the refinement of the 
subnational mobilization thesis. Subnational entities have very differential participation 
possibilities due to their varying institutional capacities—the argument soon went (Marks 
1996). Institutional well endowed regions have more and can make more out of their access 
possibilities to the European decision making process and they have also more to lose than 
institutionally weak regions if they do not to engage in subnational-supranational exchange. 
Thus, the subnational institutional situation and national actor constellations were put forward 
as explanation for differential subnational mobilization towards European policymaking. The 
more competences regional authorities have the more they are affected by European 
regulation and therefore, the higher should be their interest in participating in the 
policymaking process (Marks et al. 1996). 
 
On the question why and under which conditions, subnational actors mobilize to join EU 
policy-making, the debate through the subsequent years did not change much. Sure, the role 
of the European Commission or the Committee of the Regions, the emergence of the 
partnership principle (as an EU policy instrument), or (with respect to the accession countries) 
conditionality added new features. Recently, researchers have focused more on the precise 
conditions under which subnational mobilization is actually supposed to make a difference for 
policymaking (however long-term and diffuse their real influence might be). However, the 
relationship between subnational mobilization and policy outputs remains little understood 
(Moore 2008: 531). Some authors do not find much evidence that subnational mobilization 
actually has an impact on policy decisions (John 2000: 890), while others see subnational 
lobbying as successful efforts to seek particular outcomes (John/McAteer 1998). The 
inconclusiveness of results of second and third generation research in this field may well have 
to do with the fact that basic arguments of the subnational mobilization thesis have not been 
sufficiently tested empirically and thus provide only suboptimal basis for further theoretical 
development and consolidation. 
 
                                                 
3
 About the notion of regions, regionalism and regions in Europe see critically Keating (2008; Bauer/Börzel 
2010) 
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The fruitful theoretical debate provides a broad range of assertions and potential empirical 
implications. We chose three—as we think—crucial claims for systematic assessment. First, 
subnational mobilization as a feature of the EU multilevel level game has usually portrayed 
subnational and supranational actors as ―brothers in arms‖ in an effort to ―by-pass‖ and 
eventually to disempower the nation state. The expectation behind this claim is the emergence 
of (intensifying) interest homogeneity between subnational and supranational actors to by-
pass the national level. Such interest homogeneity is difficult to measure empirically. A 
central implication appears to be, however, that subnational actors develop a genuine interest 
in a strong and active supranational level; accordingly subnational actors should be seen, for 
example, to prefer rather a supranational, integrationist conception of EU governance than an 
intergovernmental one. 
 
Second, the enormous empirical variation in the subnational bodies’ actual eagerness to 
engage (sometimes more but sometimes less) in political exchange with the EU has 
essentially been explained with varying regional capacities and institutional constellations. 
The assumption was that the various subnational entities if they were only able to—i.e. if they 
had the resources in terms of manpower, finances and domestic institutional access—they 
kind of automatically would engage in intensifying interaction with the supranational level. 
Thus the resource base appears to determine the intensity of subnational-supranational 
political exchange, i.e. that subnational actors somehow automatically want to intensify 
subnational-supranational interaction, if their resource base is above a certain threshold. 
Empirically an implication is that institutionally or financially strong subnational entities 
should be per se interested in intense interaction with the supranational level; only the lack of 
resources and institutional capacities should prevent them from intensifying their engagement 
with the supranational level. 
 
Third, since the political environment of the ongoing unification process would little by little 
favour the intensification of subnational-supranational interaction by transnational learning, 
interregional competition or else, subnational entities (at least the ―stronger‖ ones) were 
expected to converge in their engagement with the supranational level; especially since 
political abilities (according to the first and the second expectation) would increasingly 
materialise, so would rise subnational motivations to interact vertically with the supranational 
level. In other words, one should observe subnational convergence, i.e. that (at least 
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institutionally well endowed) subnational actors are to converge with respect to their 
preferences about an engagement with the supranational level.  
 
It is thus these three central claims—first that subnational actors want a supranationalist EU, 
second that subnational actors are only prevented by lacking resource from wanting ever more 
intensive political interaction with the supranational level, and third that strong subnational 
entities are expected to converge in their engagement preferences with the supranational 
level—that we consider in the remainder of this article. In order to assess the validity of these 
claims we want to bring to bear new empirical observations taken from a recent survey of 
subnational administrative elites in five European countries (more below).  
 
3. Elite attitudes in political research 
 
Empirically our analysis is based on attitudinal data from subnational administrative elites in 
five European countries. The major strength of our data lies in that it allows cross sectional 
comparisons. But, as with all research strategies, there are downturns. In this section we thus 
briefly want to reflect upon the value of the kind of data we use for our analysis.  
 
Dispositions, beliefs and values of administrative elites are a classical field of study in 
political science and comparative public administration research (Aberbach/Putnam/Rockman 
1981; Derlien/Mayntz 1988; Page 1999; Derlien 2003; Aberbach/Rockman 2006; Goetz 
2006; Schwanke/Ebinger 2006). Administrative elites prepare, design and implement policies 
and political decisions. The preferences of administrative elites are thus seen as important 
indicators of future political choices (Le Pape/Baptiste 1999; Jeffery 2000; Roller/Sloat 2002; 
Mols/Haslam 2008).
4
 
 
The relevance of subnational administrative elites’ preferences depends on how one conceives 
the role of elite preferences in policymaking. Obviously, ―deterministic‖ arguments cannot be 
made about how an individual’s particular attitude will lead to a precise political choice on the 
part of the institution this individual works for, or to an exact political outcome. The causal 
chain is usually too long and it is difficult to control for all the other potentially influential 
                                                 
4
 It is also worth noting that the current debate about the transformation of government into governance – 
especially under the auspices of European integration – stresses technocratic expertise as a crucial resource in 
effective policymaking, which can be taken as an additional incentive to revisit the attitudes of administrative 
elites. 
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variables. Nevertheless, institutionalists argue that ―members of an institution observe and are 
the guardians of its constitutive principles and standards‖ and that their behaviour is based on 
a ―logic of appropriateness and a sense of obligations and rights derived from an identity, role, 
or membership in a political community and the ethos and practices of its institutions‖ (Olsen 
2009: 9). Thus, we can assume that there is a link between members of a bureaucracy 
(especially the upper layers) and the political authority for whose use the bureaucracy has 
been created. The individual certainly has liberty in his actions, but he is also shaped by and 
thus embodies the way his or her organization interprets the outside reality (Egeberg 2004). 
 
We see our analysis as part of a long tradition of research on elite attitudes and thus, once one 
agrees that subnational top officials occupy roles at the hub where subnational politics and 
expertise meet, there is good reason to elicit what the political preferences and opinions of 
such an influential group are (Le Pape/Baptiste 1999; Börzel 2005; Kooiman 2003). 
Subnational top officials have crucial practical powers both up (preparing decision-making, 
suggesting ideas) and down (implementation, supervision) the line. Given their key role in 
virtually all stages of the subnational policy process, it is our view that systematic knowledge 
about subnational top officials’ preferences in regard to crucial issues of European and 
subnational governance can provide important factors of explanation for particular policy 
outcomes and that it can also be used for estimating future political choices at the subnational 
political level. Knowledge about subnational top officials’ political preferences can thus serve 
as an indicator of how these individuals routinely act, and also as a potential predicator as to 
how they will likely use their discretion. This makes the political preferences of subnational 
elites a valuable object of empirical analysis.  
 
4. Data 
 
The selection of our interviewees—high-ranking officials in subnational administrations—
was carried out in three stages. Our aim was to ensure that interviewees from states with 
different institutional structures at the subnational level, i.e. from decentralized as well as 
from federal states, would be represented in the sample. Furthermore, we wanted to interview 
subnational elites in countries that have varying durations of experience with the reality of 
European integration. We thus decided to interview members of the subnational 
administrative elites in Germany, Spain, France, Poland, and Hungary.  
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Second, the selection of the subnational units was guided by the consideration of including 
interviewees with distinct regional backgrounds. In order to increase the variance of regional 
backgrounds of our interviewees, three factors were of major importance: the socioeconomic 
status of their respective regions, and their cultural and party-political distinctiveness with 
regard to the centre (the nation state). Hence, we ensured that both socioeconomically poor 
and rich regions, regions with and without a special cultural or national self-understanding, 
and regions with the same and with different governing parties compared to the party-political 
constellation governing the centre were all represented (Marks et al. 1996; Keating 2008).  
 
Third, the individual interviewees were selected on the basis of their position in the 
subnational administration. In order to be included in our sample, individuals had to hold 
management positions—usually as a head of unit. Moreover, our heads of unit had to have 
policy responsibilities as opposed to only horizontal administrative or juridical duties (cf. 
Bauer 2008). This means that only policymaking administrators were included in the sample. 
Due to the varying size and the diverging responsibilities of the regions represented in our 
sample, the numbers of interviewees per region ranges from 1 to 13. Altogether, our sample is 
comprised of 347 individuals in 60 regions (see Table 1). We developed a standardized 
questionnaire consisting of some 100 questions. The data were collected by means of 
telephone interviews conducted by native speakers in the second half of 2007.  
 
Table 1: Sample structure 
Country Regions included in sample Interviews per 
region 
Interviews per 
country 
Response rate 
Germany 13 Länder (of 16) 4-9 78 47% 
Poland 12 Voiwodships (of 16) 2-9 70 45% 
Hungary 19 Megyek (of 19) 2-7 84 41% 
France 10 Régions (of 26) 1-13 66 45% 
Spain 6 Autonomous Communities 
(of 17) 
5-11 49 53% 
n = 347  
 
Finally, what can we say about how our sample actually looks like? The subnational 
administrative elite in the countries under consideration is predominantly male and middle-
aged. Nearly 40 percent of the interviewees are between 46 and 55 years old; about 30 percent 
are over 55 years old. As for many other top positions in the public and private sector, the 
share of women is significantly lower than that of men. In fact, only about one third of the 
people represented in the sample are women. Apart from two exceptions, all interviewees 
have a university degree. Their disciplinary background is, however, quite heterogeneous. 
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Within the German Länder administrations, we observed a predominance of people trained in 
law and public administration, although the share of lawyers and public administration 
specialists in the German Länder administrations is somewhat lower than in the German 
federal administration (Luhmann 1973; Schwanke/Ebinger 2006). Among the Spanish and 
French subnational administrative elite, we also found a relative predominance of public 
servants trained in law or public policy. However, officials with other educational 
backgrounds, e.g. economics, natural sciences, and social sciences and humanities, are almost 
equally represented. Among the Polish and Hungarian subnational top bureaucrats, 
economists constitute the largest group.
5
 
 
5. Evidence  
 
We now present evidence from our data in order to assess the empirical validity of the three 
claims put forward by the subnational mobilization thesis, i.e. that subnational actors rather 
want supranationalist EU, that subnational actors have a genuine interest in seeking political 
exchange with the supranational level (unless they lack the resources to do so) and that strong 
subnational entities are expected to converge in their engagement preferences with the 
supranational level. We re-visit each of these claims in turn. 
 
5.1. Do subnational actors have a genuine interest in a strong supranational level? 
 
The logic of the first claim that we want to test is perhaps best summarised in the saying ―the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend‖. If we follow the arguments of the subnational mobilization 
thesis that the supranational institutions are on the side of the subnational authorities we 
should find that regional administrators are in favour of strong and active supranational 
institutions. A strong supranational orientation with respect to what is usually conceived of as 
the EU governance structure comprehends at least two aspects. First, the decision-making 
procedure should be rather dominated by supranational than by intergovernmental institutions. 
Second the supranational institutions should become stronger and more powerful vis-à-vis the 
nation states. Do we find in our data a clear subnational preference for a supranational 
conception of EU governance? 
 
                                                 
5
 Our data reveal that as regards the questions addressed in this article, national preference trends are clearly and 
robustly identifiable. This encourages us to focus on the presentation and comparison of the results of the 
national subsamples. See for more details about the sample Bauer et al. (2010). 
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We measured an individual’s preference for supranationalism by asking how decisions in the 
Council of Ministers should be taken, by majority or unanimity. A supranationalist attitude 
should be reflected by support for majority voting. And, indeed, only 10 percent of all 
interviewees are in favour of unanimity as the general decision-making rule, while an 
overwhelming majority (90 percent) of our interviewees state that they prefer the majority 
principle over unanimity (see table 2 below). Although we find only low cross-country 
variation, above all the French subnational elites prefer the majority criteria as general 
decision rule in the Council of Ministers. Our data thus indicate that the vast majority of 
subnational civil servants favour a supranational over an intergovernmental architecture in the 
EU. 
 
Table 2: Decision-making rule in the Council of Ministers 
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Germany Poland Hungary France Spain total
 
Note: The table reports the percentages of respondents by country favouring majority voting as the decision-
making rule in the Council of Ministers.  
 
Usually the European Commission is conceived of as the obvious supranational ally of 
subnational authorities. We thus asked several questions to tap the subnational administrators’ 
perception of Commission and other EU institutions (see table 3 below). First, we asked 
whether the Commission should become the government of the EU. Especially our Spanish 
interviewees and also the Hungarian administrators are in favour. Another question was aimed 
at a similar logic, i.e. to find out what our interviewees think about ―restrictions‖ imposed on 
the Commission’s activity. Again, subnational administrators do want to have a Commission 
free of mandatory restrictions, i.e. they do not want the Commission to be turned into a kind 
of another intergovernmental body at EU level (―Coreper III‖). It is only the Polish subsample 
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that indicates reservations about a strong European Commission. This particular Polish 
attitude is also reflected in the lower mean value for the next question about the role of the 
European Parliament. With regard to the statement that the European Parliament should have 
the same rights as the Council of Ministers during the legislative process Polish subnational 
elites are less supportive and prefer a more intergovernmental setting with a stronger Council 
of Ministers than the other administrators in general. Finally, we assessed the preferred role of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) within the European polity. In the history of European 
integration the ECJ played an important ―integrationist‖ role (Weiler 1994). Our regional 
administrators strongly agree with the statement that the ECJ should have the final judgement 
concerning disputes between member states and the EU. The broad agreement reflects also 
the general acceptance of the European jurisdiction.  
 
Table 3: Subnational Preferences for EU Governance: supranational versus intergovernmental 
 Germany Poland Hungary France Spain Total 
The EU-Commission should be the government 
of the EU. 
7.0 6.3 7.9 6.5 8.3 7.2 
Carrying out its tasks the EU-Commission should 
strictly follow the instructions of the member 
states. 
4.7 6.9 4.0 4.8 4.9 5.0 
In the EU legislative process, the European 
Parliament should have the same rights as the 
Council of Ministers in which the nation-states 
are represented. 
8.5 6.5 7.0 7.3 8.9 7.6 
In case of a dispute between the EU and a 
member state the ECJ should render the final 
judgement/be the final arbiter. 
7.7 8.9 9.5 8.0 9.1 8.6 
Note: The table reports means by country. The scale of the possible answers ranges from 1 (strong 
disagreement) to 11 (strong agreement).  
 
In general, the subnational administrative elites strongly support the supranational architecture 
of the EU. The Polish respondents, however, deviate from this picture in respect to the power 
sharing between the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of 
Ministers. At the same time we find strong cross-national approval for and trust in the 
European Court of Justice. Although the presented data reveals strong support for the 
supranational setting among the regional administrators we do not get a clear picture about the 
hypothesis ―the enemy of my enemy is my friend‖.  
 
Literature on subnational mobilisation identified different channels for regions to represent 
their interests in the European policy-making process (Hooghe 1995; Hooghe/Marks 1996). 
Using data on the rating of the helpfulness of such channels we might see that subnational 
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administrators may not see their national governments as enemies but they may have a strong 
affinity towards EU level. Indeed, asking them how helpful the institutions are when it comes 
to influencing the decisions in their favour we can see (table 4) that the national institutions 
are rated as less efficient. The national parliaments are assessed as the least helpful institution 
whereas the European parliament seems to be a better partner when regions want to influence 
the European decisions in their favour. Comparing the mean values per country for the 
national government and the European Commission which reflect two powerful institutions in 
the European institutional setting we observe that the European Commission on average 
receives a better appraisal. Except the Spanish regional administrators see their national 
government as more helpful when it comes to influencing European level decisions. In 
consequence, there is an indication that the European level institutions are seen as a potential 
ally for regional authorities in the European multilevel governance system. 
 
Table 4: Helpfulness of channels of interest representation 
 Germany Poland Hungary France Spain Total 
National Parliament 5.1 6.1 5.8 5.2 6.2 5.6 
National Government 8.3 7.9 6.1 7.9 7.7 7.5 
European Commission 8.2 9.0 6.9 8.7 7.3 8.0 
European Parliament 7.3 8.4 7.2 7.8 7.0 7.5 
Note: The table reports the means by country. The scale of the possible answers ranges from 1 (strong rejection) 
to 11 (strong support).  
 
 
5.2. Do subnational actors want to intensify subnational-supranational ties? 
 
Now we turn to the question whether subnational units are per se interested in intense 
interaction with the supranational level. As discussed above, this expectation follows the 
proposition that subnational authorities and the European arena mutually benefit from closer 
vertical cooperation. According to the subnational mobilization argument, subnational 
regional entities have a general incentive to intensify subnational-supranational ties. In order 
to empirically analyse this claim we want to introduce the distinction between establishing 
institutional structures to potentially interact and policy interaction in specific areas, i.e. what 
we conceive of as ―polity nexus‖ and ―policy nexus‖ of subnational-supranational interaction. 
What are the patterns our data contains if this distinction is made? 
 
 
 
 14 
Polity Nexus 
 
We are interested in how subnational elites assess different elements of the emerging 
institutional set-up of the subnational-supranational exchange. Therefore we examined our 
interviewees’ attitudes concerning the following issues: the participation of regional 
parliaments in the early warning system, the possibility to delegate regional ministers as 
national representatives in the Council of Ministers, the option of bringing before the ECJ 
suspected cases of breaches of the subsidiarity principle, and the usefulness of the Committee 
of the Regions as the formal representation of subnational interests in the political system of 
the EU. 
 
Subnational top officials strongly support the idea that subnational parliaments signal to the 
European Commission their suspicion that a particular EU proposal violates the subsidiarity 
principle in the context of the ―early warning system‖ (see table 5). Only German bureaucrats 
are less in favour than their counterparts elsewhere—perhaps unsurprisingly so if one 
considers that the German federalism has a strong bias in favour of vertical executive (and not 
parliamentary!) multilevel cooperation that traditionally disfavours regional parliaments. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty already established the possibility of regional ministers participating in 
the Council of Ministers as representatives of their respective member states (Hooghe 1995). 
Use of this option is made in cases where the Council of Ministers is negotiating policies that 
nationally fall under regional responsibility.
6
 How do subnational elites assess this 
institutional linkage with the European arena? We receive somewhat lower mean values of 
support for this instrument than for the option to file subsidiarity complaints in the early 
warning procedure. The reason for such reservations might be that subnational representatives 
in the Council of Ministers negotiate on the basis of a ―national‖ position. Such a national 
position usually already represents a compromise between central and subnational 
governments; therefore, regional delegates cannot unconditionally promote the position of 
their individual subnational authority. The pattern is similar with respect to direct complaints 
to the ECJ for a suspected breach of the subsidiarity principle. Spanish, French and Hungarian 
respondents are very much in favour to have such an option, the German subnational elite 
much less so.  
 
                                                 
6
 In the subnational mobilization literature, this constitutes one of several channels of representation (Hooghe 
1995; Hooghe/Marks 1996) 
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Table 5: Strengthening of the institutional nexus  
 Germany Poland Hungary France Spain Total 
Involvement of regional 
parliaments in the national 
early warning system 
7.9 8.7 9.0 8.8 8.6 8.6 
Possibility to delegate a 
subnational representative to 
the Council of Ministers 
6.9 8.2 8.1 8.3 8.4 7.9 
Right to file an action at the 
ECJ if the principle of 
subsidiarity is endangered 
5.3 7.4 8.1 8.5 8.9 7.5 
Note: The table reports the means by country. The scale of the possible answers ranges from 1 (strong rejection) 
to 11 (strong support). 
 
Finally, we asked about the desired future for the Committee of the Regions, which by many 
accounts constitutes the single most important structure of interest representation between the 
subnational and the European arenas (Hooghe 1995; Hooghe/Marks 1996). Therefore we 
might expect clear-cut preferences in favour of an institutionally strong body representing 
subnational authorities within the EU. We offered our interviewees four options to chose from 
(―abolish the CoR‖, ―keep it in its current form‖, ―strengthen the role of the institution in the 
policymaking process‖ and, finally, ―make it a true third chamber‖). The majority of our 
interviewees want indeed to give more rights to the CoR (see table 6); about one fifth of the 
interviewees even responded wants the CoR having equal competence to the Council of 
Ministers or the European Parliament (―third chamber‖). However, German bureaucrats are in 
comparison again more critical, a significant majority wants to abolish it and one third simply 
wants to maintain the CoR’s status quo.  
 
Table 6: Future role of the Committee of the Regions 
 Germany Poland Hungary France Spain Total 
Abolishment 13.3 1.5 4.0 8.2 4.2 6.4 
Maintain the status quo 34.7 16.4 14.7 13.1 6.3 18.1 
More rights at the stage of law 
formulation 
41.3 61.2 61.3 54.1 75.0 57.4 
Equal third chamber alongside 
EP and Council of Ministers 
10.7 20.9 20.0 24.6 14.6 18.1 
Note: The table reports percentages of respondents by country.  
 
In sum, our data suggests that subnational bureaucrats want to intensify modestly or 
significantly what we called the ―polity nexus‖, i.e. to introduce or optimise systemic 
structures that allow the subnational level potentially to engage in subnational-supranational 
political exchange. 
 
 
 16 
Policy Nexus 
 
What we call ―policy nexus‖ is concerned with the subnational actors’ preferences to 
participate in multilevel policymaking across particular policy areas.
7
 From our point of view 
this aspect is very relevant as it reflects subnational attitudes towards the vertical dimension 
of the EU multilevel governance system. There are two important aspects to consider when 
regional authorities want to share policy responsibility in particular areas together with the 
supranational level. First, the question in which policy areas do subnational bureaucrats want 
to see their ―regions‖ involved; second, the question when do they want to cooperate with the 
supranational level in these policy areas. It has been suggested that European regions may 
benefit politically from joined cooperation between subnational and supranational level in 
particular policy areas (Mazey 1994). Despite the debate about the policy allocation in the EU 
(Alesina/Angeloni/Schuknecht 2001; Breuss 2003), this aspect has not yet been studied 
systematically from a subnational vantage point.  
 
First, we thus asked subnational top bureaucrats whether or not regional authorities should be 
involved in policymaking across a range of twelve specific policy areas (table 12 in the 
appendix). In general, the interviewees showed only a moderate desire for subnational policy 
participation: on average, they only want subnational competences in about four policy areas. 
However, national differences become evident when the national mean values are compared. 
Whereas Hungarian respondents are satisfied with few competences (1.6), the Spanish 
demand extensive competences in about eight out of twelve policy areas. The Polish (4.8), 
French (4.3) and German (3.4) subnational elites desire only modest codetermination rights 
across policy areas in the EU multilevel system.  
 
Second, we asked subnational elites to tell us in which policy areas they want to cooperate 
with the supranational level. Overall, a constellation where policymaking is shared vertically 
across political levels and involves subnational and European actors is preferred in about one 
policy of twelve. In other words, the subnational preference for vertical cooperation in 
policymaking involving the supranational level turns out to be even lower than the 
subnational preference for policy competences as such. In short, on the basis of this data the 
subnational level should neither be seen as ―by default‖ expansive in terms of desired policy 
                                                 
7
 Aware of the fact that multilevel governance is a complex concept comprising aspects of policy competences 
and also of varying modes of coordination and interaction (Benz 2007; Benz/Zimmer 2008; Tömmel 2008), we 
focus on the former. 
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involvement nor overly sympathetic to supranational involvement where subnational policy 
competences are deemed appropriate. Both results are going down badly with present 
transformative conception of the dynamism of the emerging multilevel governance order in 
Europe. 
 
There are also national patterns (cf. table 7). German and Polish subnational administrators 
favour a subnational-supranational cooperation in about one policy whereas Hungarian 
bureaucrats do not want to have any policy competences together with the EU level. With a 
mean value of about two policies French and Spanish subnational administrators are relatively 
open for vertical interaction in policymaking together with the EU.  
 
Table 7: Subnational-supranational cooperation in twelve policies 
Country Mean SD N 
Germany 1.1 1.8 76 
Poland 0.9 1.3 65 
Hungary 0 0.2 83 
France 2.4 2.2 65 
Spain 2.2 2 49 
Total 1.3 1.8 338 
Note: The table reports in how many of the twelve policies under study the respondents favour 
competences for the EU and the regional level; reported are national mean values, standard deviation (SD) 
and number of respondents (N) per country. 
 
 
Scrutinising these preferences in more detail we identify three policies in which a stronger 
nexus between regions and the EU is supported. Research & technology, business 
development & structural policy and environmental protection (table 8). Moreover, in 
comparison to the general participation of subnational authorities in these policy areas (see 
table 13 in the appendix), the preferences for a supranational-subnational nexus are strong. 
Around half of respondents favouring subnational competences in these policy areas want the 
EU as a partner. These policies can be categorised as issues of ―low politics‖. In contrast, with 
regard to policies primarily falling under the sovereignty of the nation state, so called ―high 
politics‖, very few subnational administrators favour the involvement of regional authorities. 
Besides the policy-variation the results in table 8 also indicate that preferences for EU and 
regional cooperation in policy-making vary cross-nationally. Around one third of the German 
and Polish, and half of the French respondents, regards shared responsibilities as being most 
useful in business development & structural policy. Spanish respondents, however, prioritize 
subnational-supranational cooperation in research & technology, tourism and environmental 
protection. 
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Table 8: Preferences for Regions and the EU to hold responsibility for a range of policies 
Note: The table reports percentages of respondents being in favour of competence allocations in different 
policies in which regions and the EU hold responsibilities.  
 
In sum, subnational top-bureaucrats favour the intensification of subnational-supranational 
political exchange—to some degree. Moreover, far from wanting to expand policy 
involvement in all areas, they carefully select the policy areas in which they wish to see 
allocation of increased subnational competences. The areas where the subnational elite favour 
competences are mainly policies that can be characterised as ―low politics‖. Clearly, the 
subnational top bureaucrats’ desires for a supranational-subnational policy nexus are very 
modest. Nevertheless, in some policy areas a relatively high proportion of respondents 
favouring regional participation prefer a constellation that fosters a stronger exchange 
between the supranational and subnational governmental levels. 
 
 
5.3. Are there signs of convergence?  
 
The third expectation of the subnational mobilisation theory concerns convergence among 
comparable groups or categories of subnational entities. Obviously our survey data does not 
allow assessing convergence as growing similarity over time. We can however look for 
evidence for similar preference patterns as a substitute. According to the subnational 
mobilisation hypothesis the effects of European integration on the regional entities will vary 
in dependence upon the differential resources (institutional, financial) individual regions have 
at their disposal (Hooghe 1995: 192). More resources mean greater probability of eagerness to 
engage in vertical political exchange. Furthermore the hypothesis that institutional well 
 Policy Total Germany Poland Hungary France Spain 
Low 
politics 
tourism 12.3 7.1 0 0 18.5 48.0 
culture & schools system 8.9 4.0 4.7 0 35.4 2.0 
business development & structural policy 22.8 29.7 28.8 0 50.8 6.0 
health & consumer protection 8.9 12.9 6.2 2.6 19.7 2.0 
environmental protection 23.3 19.7 18.5 1.2 46.2 42.0 
research & technology 25.3 20.0 17.7 0 36.9 69.4 
agriculture 14.5 12.3 12.3 0 19.7 38.8 
social policy 3.6 4.0 1.6 0 9.4 4.1 
High 
politics 
asylum & immigration 2.4 1.3 1.6 0 4.8 6.0 
foreign & defence policy 0.3 1.3 0 0 0 0 
monetary policy 4.1 1.3 0 0 0 26.5 
border police & border protection 0.6 1.3 0 0 0 2.0 
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embedded regions should have a higher incentive to engage with the European level implies 
that subnational administrators of these regions should converge in their attitudes. As our 
sample includes resourceful and very modest subnational entities as well as institutionally 
strong and weak regions we should expect respective variation in the attitudes of the 
administrative elites between these groups of regions. We scrutinise similarity and variation 
between rich and poor regions as well as institutionally strong and weaker entities in order to 
assess whether the groups converge in their preferences. 
 
Taking the answer patterns about European governance, the subnational-supranational polity 
and policy nexus, one can argue that—despite different degrees of subnational autonomy—
our sample of regions’ administrators show striking similarities in their preferences. Looking 
at the descriptive data, subnational administrators are in favour of strong supranational 
institutions and have a positive attitude towards subnational-supranational interaction in 
general. At that level of generality, agreement does however not come as a big surprise. 
 
The picture changes if one engages in a more detailed analysis. Distinguishing between 
poorer and richer regions and regions with a gross domestic product lower or higher than the 
EU average with respect to the expressed attitudes about the polity nexus, we observe 
interesting results. We find that the mean values of “poorer” regions are higher than the 
means of the socio-economic richer entities (table 9). Furthermore, a Kruskal-Wallis test for 
group differences shows that these differences are significant for the early warning system 
and the right to file an action at the ECJ. This indicates that on average subnational elites 
from socio-economic well developed regions are less in favour of a strong integration of 
regional authorities in the institutional setting of the EU than their poorer counterparts. 
 
Table 9: Differences between resource rich and poor regions  
Subnational authorities 
with…  
Integration of regional 
parliaments in national 
early warning system 
Possibility to delegate a 
subnational representative 
to the Council of 
Ministers 
Right to file an action at 
the ECJ if the principle of 
subsidiarity is endangered 
GDP < EU-Average 
mean 8.9 8.1 7.8 
sd 2.4 2.9 3.1 
n 233 232 232 
GDP > EU-Average 
mean 8.1 7.6 7 
sd 2.5 3.1 3.4 
n 103 98 102 
Kruskal-Wallis test significant not significant significant 
Note: The table reports the average number of policies in which the respondents favour competences for regions 
and the EU differentiated between socio-economically strong and weak regions, that is between regions with a 
gross domestic product higher, respectively lower, than the European average. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis 
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tests show that the group differences are significant for the first and the last item. Reported are group mean 
values, standard deviation (sd) and number of respondents (n) for each group. 
 
To find implications of the factor ―institutional strength‖ we again divided our sample in two 
groups; the first characterized by a relative low degree (France, Hungary and Poland) and the 
second by a relative high degree of regional autonomy (Germany, Spain).
8
 Again, it is the 
institutionally poor equipped regions that have higher mean values indicating preferences for 
a greater political exchange with the European level (see table 10). Additionally, the result of 
the Kruskal-Wallis test points to significant group differences. 
 
Table 10: Differences between institutionally strong and weak regions in regard to the institutional nexus 
Subnational authorities 
with…  
Integration of regional 
parliaments in national 
early warning system 
Possibility to delegate a 
subnational representative 
to the Council of 
Ministers 
Right to file an action at 
the ECJ if the principle of 
subsidiarity is endangered 
low autonomy 
mean 8.9 8.2 8.0 
sd 2.4 2.8 3.0 
n 210 209 209 
high autonomy 
mean 8.2 7.5 6.7 
sd 2.5 3.1 3.3 
n 126 121 125 
Kruskal-Wallis test significant significant significant 
Note: The table reports the average number of policies in which the respondents favour competences for regions 
and the EU differentiated between institutionally strong and weak regions. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis 
tests show that the group differences are significant for all items. Reported are group mean values, standard 
deviation (sd) and number of respondents (n) for each group. Note that all group differences are significant. 
 
With respect to what we called the policy nexus we do find significant group differences 
(table 11). However, in respect to the relative socio-economic situation the picture turns out to 
be quite different than above: Administrators from socio-economic strong regions are more in 
favour for cooperation with the EU level across various policy areas. Though the standard 
deviation within the group of socio-economic strong regions is higher, the elites prefer on 
average in about two policies a constellation bringing together the European and regional 
level. Comparing the groups of regions with low and high autonomy we observe a similar 
picture than above. Although on a relatively low level administrators from institutionally 
strong entities prefer again a more intense interaction with the supranational institutions based 
on policy competences compared to their weaker counterparts.  
 
 
                                                 
8
 This classification is based on the regional scores of the regional authority index by Hooghe, Marks and 
Schakel (2010). Regions with a lower value than 10 are classified as regions with low authority. 
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Table 11: Group differences for subnational-supranational interaction in twelve policies 
 Subnational authorities with… 
 GDP < EU-Average GDP > EU-Average low autonomy high autonomy 
mean 1.0 1.8 1.0 1.6 
sd 1.5 2.2 1.7 2.0 
n 233 105 213 125 
 Kruskal-Wallis test is significant Kruskal-Wallis test is significant 
Note: The table reports the average number of policies in which the respondents favour competences for regions 
and the EU differentiated between socio-economically strong and weak regions as well as institutionally strong 
and weak authorities. A Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the group differences are significant. Reported are group 
mean values, standard deviation (sd) and number of respondents (n) for each group. 
 
In sum, our data suggests that it is administrators from institutionally weaker regions and from 
regions that are economically poorer than the EU average who are in favour of consolidating 
subnational-supranational institutional interaction (polity nexus). By contrast, with respect to 
cooperation in particular policy areas, it is the bureaucrats from regions with a GDP above 
EU-average who are in favour of involving the EU in areas where they have or seek policy 
competences (policy nexus). These results do not sit well with the subnational mobilization 
theory where in particular with view to institutional transformation along vertical dimension 
of multilevel governance, the institutionally ―stronger‖ regions were expected to take the lead. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Taking subnational administrators’ attitudes as empirical basis this article reviewed crucial 
claims put forward by the subnational mobilization theory which is itself closely related to our 
current conceptualisation of multilevel governance in Europe. Revisiting subnational 
mobilisation claims almost two decades after this theory has been developed is appropriate 
because it is based on expectations of transition and transformation, i.e. patterns of interaction 
are supposed to increase as integration intensifies. Three central implications of subnational 
mobilization theory have been analysed on the basis of subnational elite survey data: that 
subnational actors want a supranationalist EU, that subnational actors want to intensify 
subnational-supranational exchange and that in particular institutionally strong subnational 
entities are expected to converge in their preferences about interaction with the supranational 
level.  
 
In general, the regional administrative elites are indeed in favour of a supranational EU, i.e. of 
strong and independent supranational institutions. In order to have a powerful ―brother in 
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arms‖ to emancipate from national tutelage, this is precisely what should be expected on the 
basis of subnational mobilisation theory. The picture gets however more diverse when 
preferences for subnational-supranational political exchange are analysed. We distinguished 
between polity- and policy-centred exchange and found that the support for structural vertical 
interconnections which open a potential to interact are much more broadly supported than are 
wishes to cooperate with the EU in particular and concrete policy areas. With the exception of 
Germany—where reservations are palpable—European subnational administrators are clearly 
in favour of strengthening the institutional channels for political exchange with the EU 
(access to the Court of Justice to defend subsidiarity, integration of regional parliaments in the 
early warning system, strengthening of the CoR, etc.). They are, however, much less keen on 
working jointly with the supranational level in policy-making.  
 
The obvious question, then, is why would subnational elites show more enthusiasm for 
intensifying the institutional nexus, which simply constitutes channels for potentially joining 
in EU decision-making, and at the same time remain so reserved when it comes to indicating 
where they see substantial need for cooperation across governmental levels in specific policy 
areas? We tentatively conclude that subnational elite preferences in this respect indicate that 
there is little hope (or fear) of a transformative governance dynamic fuelled by the expansive 
agendas of subnational levels; subnational elites’ yardstick for competence allocation appears 
to be the status quo of their respective national systems and not a vision of an emerging 
European multilevel system in which their level could expand its authority.  
 
This view is supported by the finding that instead of wishing to extend the policy nexus, 
subnational elites appear more eager to upgrade the institutional nexus. After all, the 
institutional nexus is basically a defensive tool, good for alerting to and, if possible, inhibiting 
threatening EU decisions. At the same time, it does not entail obligations in terms of positive 
subnational action. Intensifying the policy nexus and entering into the challenges of multilevel 
policy-making would require more proactive behaviour (and probably a broader resource base 
than most of the subnational authorities in our sample have at their disposal). Our data thus 
suggests that subnational elites think that there are limits to what their subnational authorities 
should do and where they should engage in intensifying the subnational-supranational nexus 
in multilevel policy-making. Such self-restriction is of great interest – not only to those 
expecting huge transformative repercussions from multilevel policy-making also at the 
subnational level.  
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Finally, analysing the preferences for intensifying the polity- and the policy-nexus from a 
convergence perspective, we observe that it is the financially and institutionally weak ―camp‖ 
that is more eager to support polity-related interaction structures while the ―camp‖ of 
institutional stronger and economically better off regions in the eyes of their administrators do 
have some hesitation. By contrast, with respect to subnational-supranational interaction in 
concrete policy areas it is the better off regions whose bureaucrats support relatively more 
cooperation with the EU. However, the word ―relative‖ is important here, because generally 
speaking the eagerness to cooperate vertically with the EU in policymaking is—as we saw—
much less developed than the support for institutional interaction.  
 
What does this mean for the subnational mobilisation part of multilevel governance 
theorising? We would like to put the following statements to discussion. 
 
1. European governance as supranational governance is supported regardless to what is 
the presumable benefit for subnational entities in terms of nurture a potential brother 
in arms to help with emancipation from national paternalism. 
2. If we take regional bureaucrats attitudes as cues for regions as political entities, 
regions appear rather conservative, especially poor regions do not want neither for the 
EU nor for themselves great involvement in various policy areas. The transformative 
dynamic of sub-supranational exchange thus appears in this sense limited. 
3. Socio-economic and institutional characteristics appear to determine cooperation 
desires. However institutionally and economically poorer regions rather focus polity 
issues, strong regions policy issues. Subnational mobilization theory seems not to be 
able to explain that.  
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8. Appendix 
 
Table 12: The twelve policies under study 
 
 
Table 13: Preferences for regional policy competences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table reports the percentages of respondents favouring participation the subnational levels in the 
respective policy areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tourism environmental protection asylum & immigration 
culture & schools system research & technology foreign & defence policy 
business development & structural 
policy 
agriculture monetary policy 
health & consumer protection social policy border police & border protection 
Policy 
 
Percentage of respondents preferring 
subnational participation 
 
tourism 71.4 
culture & schools system 67.4 
business development & structural policy 49.3 
health & consumer protection 42.7 
environmental protection 42.6 
research & technology 39.9 
agriculture 29.1 
social policy 22.1 
asylum & immigration 18.9 
foreign & defence policy 15.3 
monetary policy 12.1 
border police & border protection 2.1 
